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Abstract15
Crypto-currencies are digital assets designed to work as a medium of exchange, e.g., Bitcoin, but they16
are susceptible to attacks (dishonest behavior of participants). A framework for the analysis of attacks17
in crypto-currencies requires (a) modeling of game-theoretic aspects to analyze incentives for deviation18
from honest behavior; (b) concurrent interactions between participants; and (c) analysis of long-term19
monetary gains. Traditional game-theoretic approaches for the analysis of security protocols consider20
either qualitative temporal properties such as safety and termination, or the very special class of one-21
shot (stateless) games. However, to analyze general attacks on protocols for crypto-currencies, both22
stateful analysis and quantitative objectives are necessary. In this work our main contributions are as23
follows: (a) we show how a class of concurrent mean-payoff games, namely ergodic games, can model24
various attacks that arise naturally in crypto-currencies; (b) we present the first practical implementation25
of algorithms for ergodic games that scales to model realistic problems for crypto-currencies; and (c) we26
present experimental results showing that our framework can handle games with thousands of states and27
millions of transitions.28
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1 Introduction33
Economic effects of security violations. Traditionally, automated security analysis of protocols34
using game-theoretic frameworks focused on qualitative properties, such as safety or liveness [32, 21,35
2], to ensure absolute security. In many cases absolute security is too expensive, and security violations36
are inevitable. In such scenarios rather than security, the economic implications of violations should37
be accounted for. In general, economic consequences of security violations are hard to measure.38
However, there is a new application area of crypto-currencies, in which the economic impact of39
an attack can be measured in terms of the number of coins that are lost. These currencies have40
considerable market value, in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars [23], thus developing a41
framework to formally analyze the security violations and their economic consequences for crypto-42
currencies is an interesting problem.43
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Crypto-currencies. There are many active crypto-currencies today, some with considerable market44
values. Currently, the main crypto-currency is Bitcoin with a value of over 150 billion dollars at the45
time of writing [23]. Virtually all of these currencies are free from outside governance and authority46
and are not controlled by any central bank. Instead, they work based on the decentralized blockchain47
protocol. This protocol, which was first developed for monetary transactions in Bitcoin [36], sets48
down the rules for creating new units of currency and valid transactions. However, it only defines49
the outcomes of actions taken by involved parties and cannot dictate the actions themselves. So,50
the whole ecosystem operates in a game-theoretic manner. The lack of an authority also leads to51
irreversibility of transactions, so if an amount of currency is transferred unintentionally or due to52
a bug, it cannot be reclaimed. This, together with the huge market values, makes it imperative to53
develop formal methods for quantifying the economic consequences before deploying the protocols.54
Dishonest interaction. The fact that protocols define only the outcomes of actions (in terms of55
loss or earning of currency), and do not force the actions themselves, means that in some scenarios56
they might give one of the parties unfair or unintended advantage over others and an incentive to57
act dishonestly, i.e. to take an unintended action. Such behavior is called an attack. We succinctly58
describe some attacks.59
The most fundamental attack in every crypto-currency is double-spending, where one party could60
in some circumstances use the same coin twice in two different purchases. While this vulnerability61
is inherent in every blockchain protocol, people still use crypto-currencies as the probability (and62
the economic consequences) of such an attack can be bounded over time.63
Another line of attacks follow from dishonest behavior of the blockchain miners who are respons-64
ible for the underlying security of the blockchain protocol and are rewarded for their operations.65
It was shown that undesirable behavior, such as block withholding [24] or selfish mining [25],66
could increase the dishonest miner’s reward, at the expense of other (honest) miners. We explain67
the block withholding attack in more detail in Section 5.1.68
Research Questions. Analyzing attacks on crypto-currencies requires a formal framework to handle:69
(a) game-theoretic aspects and incentives for dishonest behavior; (b) simultaneous interaction of the70
participants; and (c) quantitative properties corresponding to long-term monetary gains and losses.71
These properties cannot be obtained from standard temporal or qualitative properties which have72
been the focus of previous game-theoretic frameworks [32, 21]. On the other hand, game-theoretic73
incentives are also analyzed in the security community (e.g., see [13]), but their methods are normally74
considering the very special case of one-shot (stateless) or short-term games. One-shot games cannot75
model the different states of the ecosystem or the history of actions taken by participants.76
Concurrent mean-payoff games. These games were introduced in the seminal work of Shapley [44],77
and later extended by Gillette [28]. A concurrent mean-payoff game is played by two players over78
a finite state space, where at each state both players simultaneously choose actions. The transition79
to the next state is determined by their joint actions, and each transition is assigned a reward.80
The goal of one player is to maximize the long-run average of the rewards, and the other player81
tries to minimize it. These games provide a very natural and general framework to study stateful82
games with simultaneous interactions and quantitative objectives. They lead to a very elegant and83
mathematically rich framework, and the theoretical complexity of such games has been studied for84
six decades [44, 28, 9, 30, 35, 19, 29]. However, the analysis of concurrent mean-payoff games is85
computationally intractable and no practical (such as strategy-iteration) algorithms exist to solve86
these games. Existing algorithmic approaches either require the theory of reals and quantifier87
elimination [19] or have doubly-exponential time complexity in the number of states [29], and cannot88
handle beyond toy examples of ten transitions.89
Our contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:90
1. Modeling. We propose to model long-term (infinite-horizon) economic aspects of security viola-91
tions as concurrent mean-payoff games, between the attacker and the defender. The guaranteed92
payoff in the game corresponds to the maximal loss of the defender. In particular, for blockchain93
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protocols, where the utility of every transition is naturally measurable, we show how to model94
various interesting scenarios as a sub-class of concurrent mean-payoff games, namely, concurrent95
ergodic games. In these games all states are visited infinitely often with probability 1.96
2. Practical implementation. Second, while for concurrent ergodic games a theoretical algorithm97
(strategy-iteration algorithm) exists that does not use theory of reals and quantifier elimination,98
no previous implementation exists. Moreover, the implementation of the theoretical algorithm99
poses practical challenges: (a) the algorithm guarantees convergence only in the limit; and100
(b) the algorithm requires high numerical precision and the straightforward implementation101
of the algorithm does not converge in practice. We present (i) a simple stopping criterion for102
approximation, and (ii) resolve the numerical precision problem; and to our knowledge present103
the first practical implementation of a solver for concurrent ergodic games.104
3. Experimental results. Finally, we present experimental results and show that the solver for105
ergodic games scales to thousands of states and nearly a million transitions to model realistic106
analysis problems from crypto-currencies. Note that in comparison, approaches for general107
concurrent mean-payoff games cannot handle even ten transitions (see the Remark in Section 3).108
Thus we present orders of magnitude of improvement.109
2 Crypto-Currencies110
Monetary system. A crypto-currency is a monetary system that allows secure transactions of currency111
units and dictates how new units are formed. Each transaction has a unique id and the following112
components: (i) a set of inputs; and (ii) a set of outputs and (iii) locking scripts. Each input has a113
pointer to an output of a previous transaction, and each output has an assigned monetary value. A114
locking script on an output defines a condition for using the funds stored in that output, e.g. the need115
for a digital signature. An input can use funds of the output it points to only if it can satisfy this116
condition.117
Validity. A transaction is valid if these conditions hold: (a) the total value brought by the inputs is118
greater than or equal to the total value of the outputs; (b) the inputs have not been spent before; (c)119
the inputs satisfy locking scripts.120
Note that the list of transactions is the only state of the system and higher level concepts like121
account balance and users are computed directly from it. A transaction-based system is not secure if122
transactions are sent directly between users to transfer units. While validity conditions are enough123
to make sure that only valid recipients could redirect units they once truly held, there is nothing in124
the transactions themselves to limit the user from spending the same output twice (in two different125
transactions). For this purpose a public ledger of all valid transactions, called a blockchain, is126
maintained.127
Blockchain. A ledger is a distributed database that maintains a growing ordered list of valid128
transactions. Its main novelty is that it enforces consensus among untrusted and possibly adversarial129
parties [36]. In Bitcoin (and most other major crypto-currencies) the public ledger is implemented as130
a series of blocks of transactions, each containing a reference to its previous block, and is hence called131
a blockchain. A consensus on the chain is obtained by a decentralized pseudonymous protocol. Any132
party tries to collect new transactions, form a block and add it to the chain (this process is called block133
mining). However, in order to do so, they must solve a challenging computational puzzle (which134
depends on the last block of the chain). The process of choosing the next block is as follows:135
1. The first announced valid block that solves the puzzle is added to the chain.136
2. If two valid blocks are found approximately at the same time (depending on network latency),137
then there is a temporary fork in the chain.138
Every party is free to choose either fork, and try to extend it. Hence, the underlying structure of the139
blockchain is a tree. At any given time, the longest path in the tree, aka the longest chain, is the140
consensus blockchain (see Figure 1). Due to the random nature of the computational puzzle one141
branch will eventually become strictly longer than the other, and all parties will adopt it.142
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Figure 1 The longest chain dictates that the transaction tx belongs to Bob.
Mining process. The puzzle asks for a block consisting of valid transactions, hash of the previous143
block and an arbitrary integer nonce, whose hash is less than a target value. The random nature of144
the hash function dictates a simple strategy for mining: try random nonces until a solution is found.145
So the chance of a miner to find the next block is proportional to their computational power.146
Incentives for mining. There are two incentives for miners: (i) Every transaction can donate to the147
miner who finds a new block that contains it, (ii) Each block creates a certain number of new coins148
which are then given to the miner.149
Pool mining. To lower the variance of their revenue, miners often collaborate in pools [40, 13]. The150
pools have a manager who collects the rewards from valid blocks found by the members and allocates151
funds to them in proportion to the amount of work they did. Members prove their work by sending152
partial solution blocks, which are blocks with valid transactions but lower difficulty level, i.e., the153
hash of the block is not smaller than the network threshold, but it is lower than some threshold that154
was defined by the manager. As a result, pool members obtain lower variance in rewards, but have a155
small drop in expected revenue to cover the manager’s fee. Members will get the same reward for a156
partial and full solution, but the member cannot claim the full block reward for themselves. More157
precisely, a block also dictates where the block reward goes to. Hence, even if a member broadcasts158
the new block, the reward will still go to the manager.159
Overview. A crypto-currency is a network with nodes. Some of the nodes are also miners. A node160
has a local copy of the blockchain and local transaction pool, which holds valid pending transactions161
that are still not in the blockchain. When a user performs a transaction his associated nodes broadcast162
the transaction to the network. When a node receives a new transaction it checks whether it is valid163
wrt its blockchain and transaction pool. When a node receives a new block, it verifies that it is valid164
wrt consensus chain. If it is valid it adds it to the chain and updates his transaction pool accordingly.165
Whenever a new valid transaction or block is received, the node broadcasts it to all of its neighbors.166
Proof of stake mining. An emerging criticism over the huge amount of energy that is wasted in the167
mining process led to development of proof of stake protocols. In proof of stake mining the miner is168
elected with probability that is proportional to their stake in the network (i.e., number of coin units he169
holds), rather than their computation power. Current proof of stake protocols assume a synchronous170
setting [37, 47, 33] where a miner is chosen in every time slot t0. However, they differ in the way171
they reach consensus. We study a simplified version of [33].172
1. At time t0 a miner is randomly elected. She broadcasts the next block.173
2. Until time t0 + t other miners who receive the block, verify it and if it were valid, sign it and174
broadcast the signature.175
3. The block is added to the chain only if a majority of the network sign it.176
To encourage honest behavior, the elected miner and signers get rewards when the suggested block is177
accepted.178
3 Concurrent and Ergodic Games179
We first present the basic definitions and results related to concurrent games.180
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Probability distributions. For a finite set A, a probability distribution on A is a function δ : A →181
[0, 1] such that
∑
a∈A δ(a) = 1. We denote the set of probability distributions onA byD(A). Given a182
distribution δ ∈ D(A), we denote by Supp(δ) = {x ∈ A | δ(x) > 0} the support of the distribution.183
Concurrent game structures. A concurrent stochastic game structure G = (S,A,Γ1,Γ2, δ) has184
the following components:185
A finite state space S and a finite set A of actions (or moves).186
Two move assignments Γ1,Γ2 : S → 2A \ ∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assignment Γi associates with each187
state s ∈ S the non-empty set Γi(s) ⊆ A of moves available to Player i at state s.188
A probabilistic transition function δ : S × A × A → D(S), which associates with every state189
s ∈ S and moves a1 ∈ Γ1(s) and a2 ∈ Γ2(s), a probability distribution δ(s, a1, a2) ∈ D(S) for190
the successor state.191
We denote by n the number of states (i.e., n = |S|), and bym the maximal number of actions available192
for a player at a state (i.e., m = maxs∈S max{|Γ1(s)|, |Γ2(s)|}). The size of the transition relation193
of a game structure is defined as |δ| = ∑s∈S∑a1∈Γ1(s)∑a2∈Γ2(s) |Supp(δ(s, a1, a2))| ≤ n2 ·m2.194
Plays. At every state s ∈ S, Player 1 chooses a move a1 ∈ Γ1(s), and simultaneously and195
independently Player 2 chooses a move a2 ∈ Γ2(s). The game then proceeds to the successor196
state t with probability δ(s, a1, a2)(t), for all t ∈ S. A path or a play of G is an infinite sequence197
pi =
(
(s0, a01, a02), (s1, a11, a12), (s2, a21, a22) . . .
)
of states and action pairs such that for all k ≥ 0 we198
have (i) aki ∈ Γi(sk); and (ii) sk+1 ∈ Supp(δ(sk, ak1 , ak2)). We denote by Π the set of all paths.199
I Example 1. Consider a repetitive game of rock-paper-scissors, consisting of an infinite number200
of laps, in which each lap is made of a number of rounds as illustrated in Figure 2. When a lap begins,201
the two players play rock-paper-scissors repetitively until one of them wins 3 rounds more than her202
opponent, in which case she wins the current lap of the game and a new lap begins. In each round,203
the winner is determined by the usual rules of rock-paper-scissors, i.e. rock beats scissors, scissors204
beat paper and paper beats rock. In case of a tie, each player wins the round with probability 12 .205
Here we have S = {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} and Γ1 = Γ2 ≡ {R,P,S}. The game starts at state 0 and206
state s corresponds to the situation where Player 1 has won s rounds more than Player 2 in the207
ongoing lap. Edges in the figure correspond to possible transitions in the game. Each edge is labeled208
with three values a1, a2, p to denote that the game will transition from the state at the beginning209
of the edge to the state at its end with probability p if the two players decide on actions a1 and a2,210
respectively. For example, there is an edge from state 2 to state 0 labeled R,S, 1, which corresponds211
to δ(2,R,S)(0) = 1. In the figure, we use X,X in place of a1, a2 to denote that they are equal.212
Hence every play in this game corresponds to an infinite walk on the graph in Figure 2.213
Figure 2 A repetitive rock-paper-scissors game
Strategies. A strategy is a recipe to extend prefixes of a play. Formally, a strategy for Player i is a214
mapping σi : (S×A×A)∗×S → D(A) that associates with every finite sequence x ∈ (S×A×A)∗215
of state and action pairs, representing the past history of the game, and the current state s in S, a216
probability distribution σi(x · s) used to select the next move. The strategy σi can only prescribe217
moves that are available to Player i; that is, for all sequences x ∈ (S × A× A)∗ and states s ∈ S,218
we require Supp(σi(x · s)) ⊆ Γi(s). We denote by Σi the set of all strategies for Player i. Once the219
starting state s and the strategies σ1 and σ2 for the two players have been chosen, then the probabilities220
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of measurable events are uniquely defined [46]. For an event A ⊆ Π, we denote by Prσ1,σ2s (A) the221
probability that a path belongs to A when the game starts from s and the players use the strategies σ1222
and σ2; and Eσ1,σ2s [·] is the expectation measure. We call a pair of strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 a223
strategy profile.224
Stationary (memoryless) and positional strategies. In general, strategies use randomization, and225
can use finite or even infinite memory to remember the history. Simpler strategies, that either do not226
use memory, or randomization, or both, are significant, as they are simple to implement and interpret.227
A strategy σi is stationary (or memoryless) if it is independent of the history but only depends on the228
current state, i.e., for all x, x′ ∈ (S ×A×A)∗ and all s ∈ S, we have σi(x · s) = σi(x′ · s), and thus229
can be expressed as a function σi : S → D(A). A strategy is pure if it does not use randomization,230
i.e., for any history there is always some unique action a that is played with probability 1. A pure231
stationary strategy σi is called positional, and represented as a function σi : S → A.232
Mean-payoff objectives. We consider maximizing limit-average (or mean-payoff) objectives for233
Player 1, and the objective of Player 2 is the opposite (i.e., the games are zero-sum). We consider234
concurrent games with a reward function R : S×A×A→ R that assigns a reward value R(s, a1, a2)235
for all s ∈ S, a1 ∈ Γ1(s), and a2 ∈ Γ2(s). For a path pi =
(
(s0, a01, a02), (s1, a11, a12), . . .
)
,236
the average for T steps is AvgT (pi) = 1T ·
∑T−1
i=0 R(si, ai1, ai2), and the limit-inferior average237
(resp. limit-superior average) is defined as follows: LimInfAvg(pi) = lim infT→∞ AvgT (pi) (resp.238
LimSupAvg(pi) = lim supT→∞ AvgT (pi)). For brevity we denote concurrent games with mean-239
payoff objectives as CMPGs (concurrent mean-payoff games).240
I Example 2. Consider the game in Figure 2. In this game, Player 1 wins a lap whenever a red241
edge is crossed. Therefore, in order to capture the number of laps won by Player 1, rewards can be242
assigned as: R(2, R, S) = R(2, P,R) = R(2, S, P ) = 1; R(2, X,X) = 12 and 0 in all other cases.243
Values and -optimal strategies. Given a CMPG G and a reward function R, the lower value vs244
(resp. the upper value vs) at a state s is defined as follows:245
vs = sup
σ1∈Σ1
inf
σ2∈Σ2
Eσ1,σ2s [LimInfAvg]; vs = inf
σ2∈Σ2
sup
σ1∈Σ1
Eσ1,σ2s [LimSupAvg].246
The determinacy result of [35] shows that the upper and lower values coincide and give the value247
of the game denoted as vs. For  ≥ 0, a strategy σ1 for Player 1 is -optimal if we have vs −  ≤248
infσ2∈Σ2 Eσ1,σ2s [LimInfAvg].249
Ergodic Games. A CMPG G is ergodic if for all states s, t ∈ S, for all strategy profiles (σ1, σ2), if250
we start at s, then t is visited infinitely often with probability 1 in the random walk piσ1,σ2s . The game251
in Figure 2 is not ergodic. If Player 1 keeps playing rock and Player 2 scissors, then the states −1 and252
−2 are visited at most once each. We now present a more realistic version of the same game that is253
also ergodic.254
I Example 3. Consider two players playing the repetitive game of rock-paper-scissors over a255
network, e.g. the Internet. The game is loaded on a central server that asks the players for their256
moves and provides them with rewards and information about changes in the state of the game. Given257
that the network is not perfect, there is always a small probability that one of the players is unable258
to announce his move in time to the server. In such cases, the player will lose the current round.259
Assume that this scenario happens with probability  > 0. Then all probabilities in Figure 2 have to260
be multiplied by (1− ) and new transitions, which are not under players’ control and are a result261
of uncertainty in the network connection, should be added to the game. These new transitions are262
illustrated in Figure 3. Here a star can be replaced by any permissible action of the players. It is easy263
to check that this variant of the game is ergodic, given that starting from any state, there is a positive264
probability of visiting any other state within 3 steps using the new transitions only.265
Results about general CMPGs. The main results for CMPGs are as follows:266
1. The celebrated result of existence of values was established in [35].267
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2. For CMPGs, stationary or finite-memory strategies are not sufficient for optimality, and even268
in CMPGs with three states (the well-known Big Match game), very complex infinite-memory269
strategies are required for -optimality [9].270
3. The value problem, that given a CMPG, a state s, and a threshold λ, asks whether the value at271
state s is at least λ, can be decided in PSPACE [19]; and also in m2
O(n)
time, which is doubly272
exponential in the worst case, but polynomial-time in m, for n constant [29]. Both the above273
algorithms use the theory of reals and quantifier elimination for analysis.274
I Remark (Inefficiency). The quantifier elimination approach for general CMPGs considers275
formulas in the theory of reals with alternation, where the variables represent the transitions [19].276
With as few as ten transitions, quantifier elimination produces formulas with hundreds of variables277
over the existential theory of reals. In turn, the existential theory of reals has exponential-time278
complexity, is notoriously hard to solve, and its existing solvers cannot handle hundreds of variables.279
Hence, CMPGs with as few as ten transitions are not tractable.280
Results about ergodic CMPGs. The main results for ergodic CMPGs, besides the general results281
for CMPGs, are as follows:282
1. Stationary optimal strategies exist[30], but positional strategies are not sufficient for optimality.283
For precise strategy complexity see [18].284
2. Even in ergodic games, values and probabilities of optimal strategies can be irrational [18],285
and hence the relevant question is the approximation problem of values which is solvable in286
non-deterministic polynomial-time [18].287
3. The most well-known algorithm for ergodic mean-payoff games is the Hoffman-Karp strategy-288
iteration algorithm [30], which is described in detail in Appendix A.289
Note that since in ergodic games, every state is reached from every other state with probability 1, the290
value at all states is the same.291
4 Modeling Framework292
In this section we present an abstract framework to model economical consequences of attacks with293
mean-payoff games. In particular we show how broad classes of attacks can be modeled as ergodic294
games. In the next section we present concrete examples that arise from blockchain protocols. We295
start with some general aspects of mean-payoff games.296
4.1 Mean-payoff games modeling297
We describe two aspects of mean-payoff games modeling.298
1. Game graph modeling. Graph games are a standard model for reactive systems as well as299
protocols. The states and transitions of the graph represent states and transitions of the reactive300
system, and paths in the graphs represent traces of the system [38, 39]. Similarly, in modeling of301
protocols with different variables for the agents, the states of the game represent various scenarios302
of the protocols along with the valuation of the variables. The transitions represent a change of303
the scenario along with change in the valuation of the variables (for example see [21] for game304
graph modeling of protocols for digital-contract signing).305
Figure 3 Transitions due to network connectivity issues in the repetitive RPS.
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2. Mean-payoff objective modeling. In mean-payoff objectives, the costs (or rewards) of every306
transition can represent, for example, delays, execution times, cost of context switches, cost of307
concurrency, or monetary gains and losses. The mean-payoff objective represents the long-term308
average of the rewards or the costs. The mean-payoff objective has been used for synthesis of309
better reactive systems [12], synthesis of synchronization primitives for concurrent data-structures310
to minimize average context-switch costs [15], model resource-usage in container analysis and311
frequency of function calls [20], as well as analysis of energy-related objectives [7, 6, 26].312
4.2 Crypto-currency Protocols as Mean-payoff Games313
We describe how to apply the general framework of CMPGs to crypto-currencies.314
General setting. We propose to analyze protocols as a game between a defender and an attacker. The315
defender and the attacker have complete freedom to decide on their moves. The decisions of the other316
parties in the ecosystem can be modeled as stochastic choices that are not adversarial to either of the317
players.318
Reward function. The reward function will reflect the monetary gain or loss of the defender. The319
attacker gain is not modeled as we consider the worst-case scenario in which the attacker’s objective320
is to minimize the defender’s utility.321
States. States of the game can represent the information that is relevant for the analysis of the322
protocol, such as the abstract state of the blockchain.323
Stochastic transitions. Probabilities over the transitions can model true stochastic processes e.g.,324
mining, or abstract complicated situations where the exact behavior cannot be directly computed (see325
Section 5.2) or in order to simulate the social behavior of a group (see Section 5.1).326
Concurrent interactions. Concurrent games are used when both players need to decide on their327
action simultaneously or when a single action models a behavior that continues over a time period328
and the players can only reason about their opponent’s behavior after some while (see Sections 5.1329
and 5.2).330
Result of the game. In this work we want to reason on defender’s security in a protocol wrt a331
malicious attacker who aims to decrease defender’s gain at any cost. The result of the mean-payoff332
game will describe the inevitable expected loss that the defender will have in the presence of an333
attacker and defender’s strategy describes the best way to defend himself against such an attacker.334
4.3 Modeling with Ergodic Games335
In this section we describe two classes of attacks, which can be naturally modeled with ergodic games.336
Our description here is high-level and informal, and concrete instances are considered in the next337
section. The attacks we describe are in a more general setting than crypto-currencies; however, for338
crypto-currencies the economic consequences are more natural to model.339
First class of attacks. In the first class of attacks the setting consists of two companies and the340
revenues of the companies depend on the number of users each has. Thus states represent the number341
of users. Each company can decide to attack its competing company. Performing an attack entails342
some economic costs, however it could increase the number of users of the attacking company at the343
expense of the attacked one. For example, consider two competing social networks, Alice and Bob.344
Alice can decide to launch a distributed-denial-of-service (DDOS) attack on Bob, and vice-versa.345
Such attacks entail a cost, but provide incentives for Bob users to switch to Alice. The rewards depend346
on the network revenues (i.e., number of users) and on the amount of funds the company decides to347
spend for the attack. The migration of users is a stochastic process that is biased towards the stronger348
network, but with smaller probability some users migrate to the other network. Thus the game is349
ergodic. This class represents pool attacks in the context of crypto-currencies (Sections 5.1 and 5.3).350
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Second class of attacks. Consider the scenario where the state of the game represents aspects of the351
dynamic network topology. The network evolves over the course of the time, and the actions of the352
participants also affect the network topology. However, the effect of the actions only makes local353
changes. The combination of the global changes and the local effects still ensure that different network354
states can be reached, and the game is ergodic. Attacks in such a scenario where the network topology355
determines the outcome of attack can be modeled as ergodic games. This class of attacks represent356
the zero-confirmation double-spending attack in the context of crypto-currencies (see Section 5.2).357
5 Formal Modeling of Real Attacks358
In this section we show how to model several real-world examples. These examples were described359
in the literature but were never analyzed as stateful games.360
5.1 Block Withholding Pool Attack361
Pools are susceptible to the classic block withholding attack [40], where a miner sends only partial362
solutions to the pool manager and discards full solutions. In this section we analyze block withholding363
attacks among two pools, pool A and pool B. We describe how pool A can attack pool B, and the364
converse direction is symmetric. To employ the pool block withholding attack, pool A registers at365
pool B as a regular miner. It receives tasks from pool B and transfers them to some of its own miners.366
Following the notions in [24], we call these infiltrating miners, and their mining power is called367
infiltration rate. When pool A’s infiltrating miners deliver partial solutions, pool A’s manager submits368
them to pool B’s manager and proves the portion of work they did. When the infiltrating miners369
deliver a full solution, the attacking pool manager discards it.370
At first, the total revenue of the victim pool does not change (as its effective mining rate was not371
changed), but the same sum is now divided among more miners. Thus, since the pool manager fees372
are nominal (fixed percentage of the total revenue [8]), in the short term, the manager of the victim373
pool will not lose. The attacker’s mining power is reduced, since some of its miners are used for374
block withholding, but it earns additional revenue through its infiltration of the other pool. Finally,375
the total effective mining power in the system is reduced, causing the blockchain protocol to reduce376
the difficulty. Hence, in some scenarios, the attacker can gain, even in the short run, from performing377
the attack [24].378
In the long run, if miners see a decrease in their profits (since they have to split the same revenue379
among more participants), it is likely that they consider to migrate to other pools. As a result, the380
victim pool’s total revenue will decrease.381
Our modeling. We aim to capture the long term consequences of pool attacks. We have two pools A382
and B, where B is the victim pool and A is the malicious pool who wishes to decrease B’s profits.383
There is also a group of miners C who are honest and represent the rest of the network. In return,384
pool B can defend itself by attacking back. To simulate the long term effect, in every round pool385
members from A and B may migrate from one pool to another or to and from C. The migration is a386
stochastic process that favors the pool with maximum profitability for miners. We note that given387
sufficient amount of time (say a week), a pool manager can evaluate with very high probability the388
fraction of infiltrating miners in his pool. This can be done by looking at the ratio between full and389
partial solutions. Hence, in retrospect of a week, the pools are aware of each other’s decisions, but390
within this week there is uncertainty. Therefore, we use concurrent games to analyze the worst case391
scenario for pool B.392
I Theorem 4. Consider a pair of pools A and B capable of attacking each other. Let C be the pool393
of remaining miners. If the miners in each pool migrate stochastically according to the attractiveness394
levels (as detailed below), then B can ensure a revenue of at least v on average per round, against395
any behavior of A, where v is the value of the concurrent ergodic game described below.396
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5.1.1 Details of Modeling397
We provide details of our modeling to demonstrate how such attacks can be thought of in terms of398
ergodic games. Due to page limitation and similarity, such details in other cases are relegated to399
Appendix C.400
Game states. We consider two pools, A and B and assume that any miner outside these two is401
mining independently for himself. Each state is defined by two values, i.e. the fractions of total402
computation power that belongs to A and B. We use a discretized version of this idea to model403
the game in a finite number of states and let S = {1, 2, . . . , n}2 and define  = 12n+1 , where a404
state (i1, i2) ∈ S corresponds to the case where pool A owns a fraction αi1 = i1 = i12n+1 of the405
total hash power and pool B controls a fraction βi2 = i2 = i22n+1 of it. In this case the miners406
who work independently own a fraction γi1,i2 = 1− αi1 − βi2 of the total hash power.407
Actions at each state. Each pool can choose how much of its hash power it devotes to attacking408
the other pool. More formally, at each state s = (i1, i2), pool A has i1 choices of actions and409
Γ1(s) = {a01, a11, a21, . . . , ai1−11 } where aj1 corresponds to attacking pool B with a fraction j of410
the total computing power of the network. Similarly Γ2(s) = {a02, a12, a22, . . . , ai2−12 }.411
Rewards. We want the rewards to model the revenue (profit) of pool A, denoted by rA, so we let412
R(s, ai1, a
j
2) = rA(s, ai1, a
j
2), for a1 ∈ Γ1(s), a2 ∈ Γ2(s). We write rA instead of rA(s, ai1, aj2)413
when there is no risk of confusion. We define rB and rC similarly and normalize the revenues:414
rA + rB + rC = 1.415
To compute these values, we define “attractiveness”. The attractiveness of a pool is its revenue416
divided by the total computing power of its miners.417
If pool A chooses the action ai1 and pool B chooses the action a
j
2, then pool A is using a fraction418
α′ = i of the total network computing power to attack B and is receiving a corresponding419
fraction of B’s revenue while not contributing to it. Therefore the attractiveness of pool B will be420
equal to: attrB = rBβ+α′ . Similarly we have attrA =
rA
α+β′ , where β
′ = j.421
Now consider the sources for pool A’s revenue. It either comes from A’s own mining process or422
from collecting shares of B’s revenue, therefore:423
rA = (α− α′) + α′ × attrB ,424
and similarly rB = (β − β′) + β′ × attrA. The previous four equations provide us with a425
system of linear equations which we can solve to obtain the values of rA, rB , attrA and attrB .426
Since a fraction α′ + β′ of total computation power is used on attacking other pools, we have:427
attrC = 11−α′−β′ .428
Game transitions (δ). Miners migrate between pools and a pool gains or loses mining power429
based on its attractiveness. If a pool is the most attractive option among the two, it gains  new430
mining power with probability 23 , retains its current power with probability
1
6 and loses  power431
with probability 16 . On the other hand a pool that is not the most attractive option loses  power432
with probability 23 , retains its current power with probability
1
6 and attracts  new mining power433
with probability 16 . These values were chosen for the purpose of demonstration of our algorithm434
and our implementation results. In practice, one can obtain realistic probabilities experimentally.435
Ergodicity. The game is ergodic because for each two states s = (s1, s2) and s′ = (s′1, s′2) where436
|s1 − s′1| ≤ 1 and |s2 − s′2| ≤ 1, there is at least 136 probability of going from s to s′ no matter437
what choices the players make.438
Proof of Theorem 4. Ergodicity was established in the final part above. The rest follows from the439
modeling and the determinacy result.440
5.2 Zero-confirmation Double-spending441
Nowadays, Bitcoin is increasingly used in “fast payments” such as online services, ATM withdrawals442
and vending machines [22], where the payment is followed by fast delivery of goods. While the443
blockchain consensus is appropriate for slow payments, it requires tens of minutes to confirm a444
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transaction and is therefore inappropriate for fast payments. We consider a transaction confirmed445
when it is added to the blockchain and several blocks are added after it. This mechanism is essential446
for the detection of double-spending attacks in which an adversary attempts to use some of her coins447
for two or more payments. However, even in the absence of a confirmation, it is far from trivial to448
perform a double-spending attack. In a double spending attack, the attacker publishes two transactions449
that consume the same input. The attack is successful only if the victim node received one transaction450
and provided the goods before he became aware of the other, but eventually the latter was added to451
the blockchain. In an ideal world the attacker can increase his odds by broadcasting one transaction452
directly to the victim and the other at a far apart location, while on the other hand the victim can453
defend itself by deploying several nodes in the network in strategic locations. In the real world,454
however, the full topology of the network is never known to either of the parties. Nevertheless, based455
on history and network statistics one can estimate the odds of a successful attack given the current456
state of the network [11].457
The victim has to decide on a policy for accepting zero-confirmation transactions. In particular458
he has to decide on the probability of whether to wait for a confirmation or not. If he waits for459
confirmation, then the payment is guaranteed, but customer satisfaction is damaged, and as a result460
the utility is smaller than the actual payment. If he does not wait for a confirmation, then the payment461
might be double spent. In the long term, the victim could decide to change the topology of the462
network. As it does not have full control over the topology, the outcome of the change is stochastic.463
Moreover, even when the victim does not initiate a change, the network topology is dynamic and464
keeps changing all the time. Hence, the odds of a successful attack are constantly changing in small465
stochastic steps.466
Our modeling. We aim to analyze the worst case long run loss of the victim. In our model we467
abstract the network topology state and consider only the odds of successful double spending. We468
consider a scenario where the victim’s honest customers typically purchase goods worth 10 units per469
round. In every round, the victim decides on a policy for accepting fast payment, and the attacker,470
concurrently, unaware of the victim’s policy, has to decide the size of the attack. After every round,471
the victim decides if he wants to do a thorough change in the network topology. If he decides on472
a change, then the next state is chosen uniformly from all possible states (this represents the fact473
that neither players has full knowledge on the topology). If he decides to make no change, then the474
network state might still change, due to the dynamic nature of the network. In this case the next state475
is with high probability either the current state, or a state which is slightly better or slightly worse for476
the victim, but with low probability the state changes completely to an arbitrary state in the network477
(as sometimes small changes in the topology have big impact). The rewards stem from the outcome478
of each round in the following way: The payment is the sum of the honest customer purchases and479
the payment of the attacker (if it gets into the blockchain). The reward is the payment minus some480
penalty in case the victim has decided to wait for a confirmation. The fact that the network state is481
constantly changing makes our model ergodic. A proof and more details of the following Theorem482
are provided in Appendix C.1.483
I Theorem 5. Consider a seller and an attacker in the zero-confirmation double spending problem.484
The seller can ensure profit of at least v on average per round, where v is the value of the corresponding485
CMPG.486
5.3 Proof of Stake Pool Attack487
Proof of stake protocols allow miners to centralize their stakes in a pool. In such pools the withholding488
attack is not relevant as mining does not require any physical resources. However, poolAmight attack489
an opponent pool B by not signing or broadcasting its blocks. A successful attack would prevent the490
block from getting signed by a majority of the network. The result would be a loss of mining fees for491
B and can encourage miners to migrate from the pool. An unsuccessful attack decreases A’s signing492
fee revenue.493
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Our modeling. We assume a setting similar to that of Section 5.1, where there are two opponent494
pools A and B, and the rest of the network consists of honest pools who sign every block that arrives495
on time. The states of the game are the stakes of each pool, namely α for pool A and β for pool B.496
In every round, with probability 1 − (α + β) neither of the pools is elected to mine a block, and497
no decisions are made. Otherwise, with probability αα+β pool A is elected and otherwise pool B is498
elected. When a pool is elected, the other pool decides whether to sign and broadcast the resulting499
block or not. In addition the network state and connectivity induce a distribution over the fraction of500
honest miners that receive the block. If the block is accepted, then its creator is rewarded with mining501
fees, and the other pool will get its signing fees only if it signed the block. A proof and more details502
of the following Theorem are provided in Appendix C.2503
I Theorem 6. Consider two pools A and B in a proof of stake mining system that can choose504
to attack each other by not signing blocks mined by the other pool. Consider that the rest of the505
network consists of independent miners who observe published blocks according to a predefined506
probability distribution and sign every valid block they observe. If the miners migrate according to507
the attractiveness levels (as described in Section 5.1), then B can ensure an average revenue of v508
against any behavior of A, where v is the value of the corresponding CMPG.509
6 Implementation and Experimental Results510
In this section we present our implementation details and experimental results. The code is available511
at http://ist.ac.at/~akafshda/concur2018.512
6.1 Implementation Challenges513
We have implemented the strategy-iteration algorithm for ergodic games (see Appendix A for pseudo-514
code and more details). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of this algorithm.515
The straightforward implementation of the strategy-iteration algorithm for ergodic games has two516
practical problems, which we describe below.517
1. No stopping criteria. First, the strategy-iteration algorithm only guarantees convergence of values518
in the limit, and since values and probabilities in strategies can be irrational, convergence cannot519
be guaranteed in a finite number of steps. Hence we need a stopping criterion for approximation.520
2. Numerical precision issues. Second, the stationary strategies in each iteration are obtained through521
solution of linear-programming, which has numerical errors, and the probabilities sum to less522
than 1. If these errors remain, they cascade over iterations, and do not ensure convergence523
in practice for large examples. Hence we need to ensure numerical precision on top of the524
strategy-iteration algorithm.525
Our solution for the above two problems are as follows:526
1. Stopping criteria. We first observe that the value sequence which is obtained converges from527
below to the value of the game. In other words, the value sequence provide a lower bound to the528
lower value of the game. Hence we consider a symmetric version which is the strategy-iteration529
algorithm for player 2, and run each iteration of the two algorithms in sequence. The version for530
player 2 provides a lower bound on the lower value for player 2, and thus from that we can obtain531
an upper bound on the upper value of player 1. Since the upper and lower values coincide, we532
thus have both an upper and lower bound on the values, and once the difference is smaller than533
 > 0, then the algorithm has correctly approximated the value within  and can stop and return534
the value and the strategy obtained as approximation.535
2. Numerical precision. For numerical precision, instead of obtaining the results from the linear536
program, we obtain from the linear program the set of tight and slack constraints, where the tight537
constraints represent the constraints where equality is obtained, and the other constraints are538
slack ones. From the tight constraints, which are equalities, we obtain the result using Gaussian539
elimination, which provides more precise values to the solution. We also provide other heuristics,540
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such as adding the remaining probability to the greatest probability action, and obtain similar541
results on convergence.542
6.2 Experimental Results543
We provide experimental results for all games in Section 5. We show number of transitions in the544
game (#T), number of states in the game, the running time and number of strategy iterations (#SI) for545
every scenario.546
#T States #SI Time(s)
17050 100 4 69
56252 196 2 291
135252 289 2 389
236000 400 2 1059
331816 484 2 3880
508032 576 2 6273
720954 676 2 17014
966281 784 2 53103
1269450 900 2 100435
#T States #SI Time(s)
19940 100 2 426
40040 200 2 800
60140 300 2 1141
80240 400 2 1586
100340 500 2 2069
120440 600 2 1253
140540 700 2 2999
160640 800 2 3496
180740 900 2 3917
#T States #SI Time(s)
6076 99 18 471
20956 275 8 1338
31744 396 9 2520
44764 539 4 1073
77500 891 16 22125
119164 1331 27 32636
169756 1859 10 31597
262384 2816 12 89599
Table 1 Experimental results for block-withholding pool attack (left), zero-confirmation double-spending
(center) and proof of stake pool attack (right).
Note that #SI is not monotone in the number of states. Intuitively the number of needed iterations547
depends on the extent in which easy locally optimal strategies are also globally optimal. In addition548
the strategy iteration algorithm starts with an arbitrary random strategy, and hence the number of549
iterations also depends on the initial strategy. However, it is worthy to note that in all cases the number550
of iterations required is quite small. We also note that since the number of iterations is small, the551
crucial computational step is every iteration, where many linear-programming problems are solved.552
Outputs of the algorithm. The outputs provided the following results:553
For the block withholding pool attack game, the algorithm could guarantee a mean-payoff of554
0.49 for the victim pool. In absence of an attacker the pool becomes the most attractive option555
for miners and grows to maximum possible size with probability 1, hence if there is no other556
pool the mean-payoff will be 1. Also, if there are two pools A and B with hash powers α and557
β respectively, and they decide not to attack each other, then they will both become the most558
attractive option and will grow with the same rate, leading to a mean-payoff of α+ 1−α−β2 for A559
and β + 1−α−β2 for B.560
For the zero-confirmation double-spending game, the algorithm verified that the seller is guaran-561
teed to maintain at least half of her revenue, i.e., in presence of a malicious attacker, the value for562
the seller converges to 5 as the number of states increase, while it is 10 in absence of it.563
For the proof of stake pool attack game, by increasing the number of states, i.e., by refining the564
discretization, the guaranteed value (game value) decreases and tends to zero. In absence of an565
attacker, a pool A can achieve an expected payoff of 11sA at a turn where sA is the stake it holds.566
This is because it earns an average of 10sA from mining fees and sA from signing. In this case,567
since the pool becomes the most attractive option, it gains miners and reaches a stake of 1, leading568
to a mean-payoff of 11.569
For the exact details see Appendix C. Our algorithm also finds strategies that achieve these values.570
571
7 Related Work572
Basic bitcoin security. The first security analysis of the Bitcoin protocol was done by Nakamoto [36]573
who showed the resilience of the blockchain protocol against a double-spending attack. His analysis574
was later corrected by Rosenfeld [41] who showed that the use of probabilistic arguments in the575
original analysis was not sound. Rosenfeld’s analysis gives different numerical results, but still576
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certifies the original security properties. Recently Sompolinsky and Zohar [45] further refined the577
analysis by considering the fact that the attacker can observe the possible states of the blockchain578
before choosing to attack, and thus he can increase his utility by choosing the right time to attack.579
Pools attack. The danger of a block withholding attack is as old as Bitcoin pools. The attack was580
described by Rosenfeld [40] as early as 2011, as pools were becoming a dominant player in the581
Bitcoin world. While it was obvious that a pool is vulnerable to a malicious attacker, Eyal [24]582
showed that in some circumstances a pool can benefit by attacking another pool, and thus pool mining583
is vulnerable also in the presence of rational attackers. However, the analysis only considered the584
short term, i.e., the profit that the pool can get only in the short period after the attack. Laszka et585
al. [34] studied the long term impact of pools attack. In their framework miners are allowed to migrate586
from one pool to another. They analyzed the steady equilibrium in which the size of the pools become587
stable (although there is no guarantee that the game will converge to such a scenario). Our framework588
is the first to allow analysis of long term impacts without convergence assumptions.589
Zero-confirmation double-spending. Zero-confirmation double-spending was experimentally analyzed590
by Karame et al. [31] who gave numerical figures for the odds of successful double spending for591
different network states. However, their analysis did not consider the fact that the victim may592
change his connectivity state. Our work is the first analysis framework for the long term impact of593
zero-confirmation double-spending.594
Stateful analysis. A stateful analysis of blockchain attacks was done by Sapirshtein et al. [43] and by595
Sompolinsky and Zohar [45]. In their analysis the different states of the blockchain were taken into596
account during the attack. The analysis was done using MDPs (a single player game, where only one597
player makes the choices) in which only the attacker decides on his actions and the victim follows a598
predefined protocol. A recent work [16] has also considered abstraction-refinement for finite-horizon599
games in the context of smart contracts. However, it neither considers long-term behavior, nor600
mean-payoff objectives, nor can it model attacks such as double-spending and interactions between601
pools (see Appendix B for more details).602
Quantitative verification with mean-payoff games. The mean-payoff games problem has been studied603
extensively as a theoretical problem in various models [38, 39]. The mean-payoff games problem604
has also been studied in the context of verification and synthesis for performance related issues605
[12, 15, 20, 7, 6, 26] (see Section 4.1 for more details). However all these works focus on turn-based606
games, and none of them consider concurrent games. To the best of our knowledge concurrent607
mean-payoff games have not been studied in the setting of security that we consider, where the608
quantitative objective is as crucial as safety critical issues. Practical implementation of algorithms for609
ergodic CMPGs do not exist in the literature.610
Formal methods in security. There is a huge body of work on program analysis for security (see [42, 1]611
for surveys). Formal methods are used to create safe programming languages (e.g., [27, 48, 42])612
and to define new logics that can express security properties (e.g., [14, 4, 3]). They are also used to613
automatically verify security and cryptographic protocols, e.g., [2, 10] and [5] for a survey. However,614
all of these works aimed to formalize qualitative properties such as privacy violation and information615
leakage. The works of [32, 21] consider analysis of security protocols with turn-based games and616
qualitative properties. To our knowledge, our framework is the first attempt to use concurrent617
mean-payoff games as a tool for reasoning about economic effects of attacks in crypto-currencies.618
8 Conclusion and Future Work619
In this work we considered concurrent mean-payoff games, and in particular the subclass of ergodic620
games, to analyze attacks on crypto-currencies. There are several interesting directions to pursue:621
First, various notions of rationality are relevant to analyze games where the attacker is rational, rather622
than malicious, and aims to maximize his own utility instead of minimizing the defender’s utility623
(e.g., secure-equilibria [17] or other related notions). Second, we consider two-player games, and the624
extension to multi-player games to model crypto-currency attacks is another interesting problem.625
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A The Hoffman-Karp Strategy-iteration Algorithm730
For an ergodic CMPG G and a state t, the basic informal description of the algorithm is as follows.731
In every iteration i, the algorithm considers a stationary strategy σi1, and then improves the strategy732
locally as follows: first it computes the potential vσ
i
1
s (described below) given σi1, and then for every733
state s, the algorithm locally computes an arbitrary optimal distribution at s to improve the potential.734
The intuitive description of the potential is as follows: Fix the specific state t as the target state (where735
the potential must be 0); and given a stationary strategy σ, consider a modified reward function that736
assigns the original reward minus the value ensured by σ. Then the potential for every state s other737
than the specified state t is the expected sum of rewards under the modified reward function for the738
random walk from s to t. The local improvement step is obtained as a solution of a matrix game with739
the potentials. The formal description of the algorithm is given in Figure 4, and the formal definition740
of the expected one-step reward ExpRew and one-step function OneSt is below.741
Notations: ExpRew and OneSt. The expected one-step reward ExpRew(s, σi1, a2) for a stationary742
strategy σi1 for Player 1, that specifies a distribution σ
i
1(s) for every state, and an action a2 ∈ Γ2(s),743
is as follows:744
ExpRew(s, σi1, a2) =
∑
a1∈Γ1(s)
R(s, a1, a2) · σi1(s)(a1) .745
Similarly, we will also use the following notation:746
δ(s, σi1, a2)(s′) =
∑
a1∈Γ1(s)
δ(s, a1, a2)(s′) · σi1(s)(a1) .747
For notional convenience, given a vector x = (xi)i∈S , a state s and a pair of distributions d1 ∈748
D(Γ1(s)) and d2 ∈ D(Γ2(s)), we let OneSt(x, d1, d2, s) be749
OneSt(x, d1, d2, s) =
∑
a1∈Γ1(s)
a2∈Γ1(s)
s′∈S
d1(a1) · d2(a2) · δ(s, a1, a2)(s′) · xs′ .750
Also, given a vector x = (xi)i∈S , a state s and a stationary strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2), we will let751
OneSt(x, σ, s) be752
OneSt(x, σ, s) = OneSt(x, σ1(s), σ2(s), s)753
Computation of every iteration. The computation of every iteration is as follows. The computation754
of the unique solution gi and (vis)s∈S is obtained in polynomial time using linear programming.755
The fact that the solution is unique follows from the fact that once a strategy for Player 1 is fixed,756
we obtain an MDP for Player 2, and then the MDP solution is unique. The value sequence (gi)i≥1757
obtained by the Hoffman-Karp algorithm converges to the value g of the game [30].758
B Comparison with other game-theoretic works759
Previous works [16, 13] consider either one-shot or finite-horizon games for security analysis. In760
contrast, the main differences of our work are as follows:761
Finite-horizon (or bounded-horizon) games can be reduced to one-shot games with an exponential762
blow up in the number of strategies. Thus one-shot and finite-horizon games are conceptually763
similar, though there are computational complexity differences. In contrast to finite-horizon764
games, we consider infinite-horizon games, which is conceptually different from finite-horizon765
games and there is no reduction (even with a blow up) to finite-horizon or one-shot games.766
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Function HoffmanKarp(G,t)
Let σ11 be a Player-1 stationary strategy;
for (i ∈ Z+) do
Compute gi, (vis)s∈S as the unique solution of
gi + vis = min
a2∈Γ2(s)
(ExpRew(s, σi1, a2) + OneSt(vi, σi1(s), a2, s)
∀s ∈ S
vit = 0;
for (s ∈ S) do
Let Ms be the matrix game defined as follows;
for (a1 ∈ Γ1(s) and a2 ∈ Γ2(s)) do
Ps[a1, a2] := OneSt(vi, a1, a2, s);
Ms[a1, a2] := R(s, a1, a2) + Ps[a1, a2];
if (σi1(s) is an optimal distribution for Ms) then
σi+11 (s) := σ
i
1(s);
else
σi+11 (s) := Optimal distribution over Γ1(s) for Ms;
if (σi+11 = σ
i
1) then
return σi1;
Figure 4 Strategy-iteration algorithm for solving ergodic games
In finite-horizon games for crypocurrency, the focus is on abstraction-refinement [16]. In contrast,767
we consider a special class of games (ergodic games) and use algorithmic approaches for finding768
their values.769
In this work we consider attacks that are inherent in the Blockchain, such as double-spending and770
pool-attacks. Previous works do not consider the analysis of such attacks.771
C Formal Modeling of Problems as Concurrent Games772
C.1 Formal Modeling of Zero-confirmation Double-spending773
Game states. Each state of the game corresponds to a probability of success for double spending774
attack which is an abstraction of the network topology.775
We discretized the game into n+ 1 states and set776
S = {0, 1, . . . , n}.777
The state 0 is called a shuffling state. Each other state i corresponds to a double spending success778
probability of pi = 0.1 + (i−1)×0.4n for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Player 1 is the seller and player 2 is the779
malicious buyer.780
Actions at each state. The shuffling state, 0, corresponds to the seller deciding to disconnect781
and reconnect to the network so as to randomly obtain one of the other states. Therefore each782
player has only one action, i.e. no choice, in this state. We denote these actions by a01 and a
0
2783
respectively.784
At each other state the seller can decide to disconnect from the network and then reconnect to785
it. Moreover he can choose whether to require a confirmation and wait for it, so the seller has 4786
possible actions. We denote these actions by ai1 as in the following table:787
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action reconnect confirmation
a01 No No
a11 Yes No
a21 No Yes
a31 Yes Yes
788
The malicious buyer can decide how much double spending to attempt. He can attempt between 1789
and 20 units of double spending. We denote the action of attempting d units of double spending790
as ad2.791
Game transitions. If the game is in the shuffling state, the next state will be one of the other n792
states and all of them are equally likely, i.e.793
δ(0, a01, a02)(i) =
1
n
,794
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.795
Otherwise, if the seller decides to reset his connection to the network, the game will be transitioned796
to the shuffling state with probability 1, no matter what choice was made by the buyer. More797
formally,798
δ(s, a11, a2)(0) = δ(s, a31, a2)(0) = 1,799
for all s ∈ S \ {0} and a2 ∈ Γ2(s).800
Otherwise, if the seller decides to wait for a confirmation, then the attack will be unsuccessful801
and if he does not wait for a confirmation, then the current state defines the odds of a successful802
attack. So the attack will succeed with probability803
pa(s, a1) =
{
ps a1 ∈ {a01, a11}
0 a1 ∈ {a21, a31} .804
We consider two cases. If the attack is successful, the game transitions to state n, i.e. the state805
with the highest probability of double-spending success,806
δa(s, a1, a2)(n) = pa(s, a1),807
for s ∈ S \ {0}, a1 ∈ {a01, a21} and a2 ∈ Γ2(s). Intuitively, this is because if the attacker was808
successful once, he can repeat the attack.809
If the attack fails, then if the game is at state s, it goes to each of the states s− 1, s and s+ 1 (if810
they exist and are non-zero) with equal probability. This captures small changes in the topology811
of the network that can be caused by factors that are not parties to the game, like other people812
reconnecting to the network. Also the game will transition to the shuffling state with a small813
probability pdc. This models the natural loss of connection that may occur in the network and cause814
the seller to reconnect even though he did not intentionally decide to do so. In the implementation815
we set pdc = 0.001. More formally by letting Ns = {s− 1, s, s+ 1} ∩ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have816
δb(s, a1, a2)(0) = pdc(1− pa(s, a1)),817
818
δb(s, a1, a2)(s′) =
1− pa(s, a1)
|Ns| × (1− pdc),819
where s ∈ S \ {0}, s′ ∈ Ns, a1 ∈ {a01, a21} and a2 ∈ Γ2(s).820
Finally we set the probability of transitioning to a state s′ as the sum of the two probabilities821
obtained in the cases above:822
δ(s, a1, a2)(s′) = δa(s, a1, a2)(s′) + δb(s, a1, a2)(s′)823
for s, s′ ∈ S \ {0}, a1 ∈ {a01, a21} and a2 ∈ Γ2(s).824
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Rewards. The rewards model net income (profit) of the seller. Transitions from the shuffling state825
carry a reward of zero, since the seller is unable to sell any goods while his connection is being826
reset. Formally,827
R(0, a01, a02) = 0.828
Assuming that the seller has a profit ratio of p. We model the rewards to capture his profit. In the829
implementation we have set p = 0.5. Recall that the malicious buyer, when choosing action ad2,830
is trying to double-spend an amount d, 1 ≤ d ≤ 20 and that other buyers are interested in buying831
10 units of goods from the seller.832
Again we consider two cases. If the double spending attack is successful, this will yield to a total833
payoff of −d(1− p) for the seller while an unsuccessful attack gives him a profit of dp. So we834
can set835
R1(s, a1, ad2) = dp(1− pa(s, a1))− d(1− p)pa(s, a1)836
for s ∈ S \ {0}, a1 ∈ Γ1(s) and 1 ≤ d ≤ 20.837
Now we focus on the profit of selling to other (non-malicious) buyers. If the seller decides to838
wait for a confirmation, he will not be able to serve a fraction f of his other customers, who are839
not willing to wait. We have set f = 0.5 in the implementation. So he gets a total revenue of840
10p(1− f) from his other customers. On the other hand, if he does not wait for a confirmation he841
will receive a payoff of 10p, so842
R2(s, a01, ad2) = R2(S, a11, ad2) = 10p,843
844
R2(s, a21, ad2) = R2(s, a31, ad2) = 10p(1− f),845
for s ∈ S \ {0} and 1 ≤ d ≤ 20.846
The final payoff is the sum of profits that the seller makes by selling to the malicious buyer and847
others, i.e.848
R(s, a1, a2) = R1(s, a1, a2) +R2(s, a1, a2)849
for s ∈ S \ {0}, a1 ∈ Γ1(s) and a2 ∈ Γ2(s).850
Ergodicity. This game is ergodic. Starting with any state and strategy profile, the shuffling state,851
0, is visited infinitely often with probability 1. This is because any choice of actions by the852
two players at each turn would switch the game to the shuffling state with probability at least853
pdc. Since the shuffling state is visited infinitely often, and since all other states have a non-zero854
probability of following the shuffling state, we conclude that every state in the game is visited855
infinitely often with probability 1 and hence the game is ergodic.856
Proof of Theorem 5. We have already shown that the game is ergodic. The rest is obtained from the857
modeling and the determinacy result.858
C.2 Formal Modeling of Proof of Stake Pool Attack859
Game States. We consider two pools, A and B and, as in the block withholding game, assume860
that any miner outside the two pools mines independently and set  = 12n+1 . We set S ⊆861
{1, 2, . . . , n} × {1, 2, . . . , n} × {0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 1}, where each state in S is of the form of862
a 3-tuple like s = (i, j, p) and corresponds to a situation in the game where pool A has a total863
mining power of i, pool B has j and whenever a mined block is announced, the number of864
independent stake signatures that it receives is drawn from the Poisson distribution with parameter865
(1 − i − j)p. The intuition is that p is a measure of connectivity of the network and each866
miner sees the block and signs it with this probability. We are using Poisson distribution as a867
rough continuous approximation of the binomial distribution. In real life, the distribution can be868
obtained by trial and error on the network.869
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Actions at each state. Each pool has two choices at each state: to sign a block mined by the other870
pool, or to refrain from signing. We show these with as1, a
r
1 for pool A and a
s
2, a
r
2 for B.871
Rewards. We consider pool A’s revenue as game rewards. Several cases should be considered:872
1. If A is chosen to mine the next block and the mined block gets signed by a majority of stakes,873
either including B or not, then A gets a mining reward of 10 units.;874
2. If B is chosen to mine the next block and A opts to sign it then A gets a signing reward of i,875
i.e. the total signing reward for each block is 1 unit;876
3. Similarly if an independent miner, or A itself for that matter, gets to mine the next block, A’s877
revenue will be i units 1.878
More concretely, we have RA = R1 + R2 + R3, where RA is the revenue of pool A and879
Ri corresponds to revenues from each of the parts above. Let CDF denote the cumulative880
distribution function corresponding to the distribution mentioned above, then we have:881
R1 = 10i×

1 i ≥ 12
1 B chooses as2 and i+ j ≥ 12
1− CDF ( 12 − i) B chooses ar2 and i < 12
1− CDF ( 12 − i− j) B chooses as2 and i+ j < 12
,882
The first case corresponds to the situation where A has enough stakes to sign his own block883
with a majority. The second case is when A and B form a majority together and B has chosen884
to sign A’s block. In the third case, A is not holding a majority and B is not signing the block,885
so in order for A to get the block mining fees, a fraction of other miners holding at least 12 − i886
must sign the block. The fourth case captures the state where both A and B sign the block but887
they do not form a majority.888
R2 = j×
{
0 A chooses ar1
i A chooses as1
,889
R3 = i(1− j).890
Pool B’s revenue, RB , can be defined similarly and will be used in the next part.891
Game transitions. The attractiveness of a pool is defined as its revenue divided by its stake, i.e.892
attrA = RAi and attrB =
RB
j . We do not consider the attractiveness of independent mining in893
this game. A pool gains or loses mining stake based on its attractiveness. If it is the most attractive894
of the two, it gains  stake with probability 23 , retains its current stake with probability
1
6 and loses895
 stake with probability 16 . Otherwise, it loses  stake with probability
2
3 and retains and gains896
with probability 16 each. This is very similar to the case in the block withholding game.897
The value of p remains the same or switches to one of the neighboring values with equal probability.898
This captures small changes in the network.899
Ergodicity. The argument for ergodicity is similar to the case of block withholding game.900
Proof of Theorem 6. As above, ergodicity of the game is established in the exact same manner901
as in the block withholding game. The rest follows straightforwardly from the modeling and the902
determinacy result.903
C.3 Details of Experimental Results904
Number of States. The number of states in each of the experiments is determined as follows:905
1. Block withholding pool attack game. In this game the number of states depends on the discretiza-906
tion factor of the mining power. For example, for a discretization factor n, we say that pool A has907
m units if its total mining power is m/n fraction of the entire computation power of the network.908
Since we need to keep track of the mining power of A and B we have O(n2) states.909
1 We assume that A always signs blocks found by itself and independent miners.
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2. Zero-confirmation double-spending game. Here the number of states are exactly the different910
abstracted network states. For example if the minimal (maximal) odds for successful double-911
spending are 30% (70%) and we consider a discretization factor of 1/n%, then we will have 40n912
states.913
3. Proof of stake pool attack game. Here the number of states is dependent upon both the discretiza-914
tion factor of mining stakes of the pools and the number of different abstracted network states. For915
example, if we consider s network states and discretize mining stakes similar to Part 1 above, then916
the game will have O(sn2) states to keep track of the stakes of both pools and the connectivity of917
the network.918
Experiment Machine and Parameters. We obtained the results using an AMD Dual-core919
Opteron 885 (2.6 GHz) processor over Debian 3.2 OS with 32 GB of RAM and  = 0.01. The input920
is an ergodic game as described in Section 5 and we are using Poisson distribution as the distribution921
mentioned in the formal modeling of the proof of stake pool attack game.922
